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MUSICAL TWOFOLDNESS
1. Introduction
The concept of twofoldness plays an important role in understanding
the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. The general idea is that when we appre-
ciate pictures aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to both the depicted
object and the way it is depicted in the picture’s surface. Given the cen-
trality of this concept in the depiction literature, a tempting thought is that the
aesthetic appreciation of music may also have a similar twofold character.
Although this thought may be tempting, it is important to note that
while in the case of the aesthetic appreciation of pictures, the two folds of
our experience are what is represented in the picture and the way it is rep-
resented in the picture, the same distinction is somewhat difficult to make
in the case of the experience of music as it is not clear whether and in what
sense music is representational. Although there have been some recent
attempts to argue that at least Western tonal music since 1650 is in fact
representational (see esp. Nussbaum 2005), the mainstream view is that
musical works in general do not represent anything.
My claim is that in spite of this important asymmetry between pic-
tures and music, the concept of twofoldness does play a crucial role in
understanding the experience of musical performances: when we aesthet-
ically appreciate a musical performance, we simultaneously attend to both
the features of the performed musical work and the features of the token
performance we are listening to. This experience is twofold in the same
sense as the aesthetic appreciation of pictures is supposed to be twofold,
where we simultaneously attend to both the depicted object and the way
it is depicted in the surface. Note that the claim is not about the aesthetic
appreciation of music per se, but about the aesthetic appreciation of musi-
cal performances (more about this distinction in Section III). Note also
that this concept of the musical twofoldness does not take it for granted
that music is representational.
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An important clarification about the scope of the claim I am defend-
ing here: I am interested in the aesthetic appreciation of performances of
musical works. Some musical performances are not performances of
musical works—for example, the long saxophone improvisation in
“Odwalla theme” (Art Ensemble of Chicago: Coming Home Jamaica) is
not the performance of any (pre-existing) musical work (see Davies 2001,
16–19; Young-Matheson 2000; Alperson 1984 on the ontology of jazz
improvisation). Hence, my account of the aesthetic appreciation of the
performance of musical works does not say anything about the aesthetic
appreciation of jazz improvisations. Further, some musical works cannot
be performed in a way that would count as a ‘genuine’ performance. One
famous example is Conlon Nancarrow’s Studies for Player Piano, where
the pieces are too difficult to play for even the most technically skilled
pianists—they can only be played by a player piano—which, arguably,
does not count as a genuine performance of the musical work.1Again, my
account says nothing about the aesthetic appreciation of musical works of
this kind. My claim is restricted to the aesthetic appreciation of genuine
performances of musical works.
The plan is the following: in Section II, I briefly explain the concept
of twofoldness as it is used in the depiction literature. In Section III, I out-
line my account of the twofold experience of musical performances.
Section IV gives an overview of the explanatory force of this concept in
terms of accounting for some salient features of our experience of musi-
cal performances, including the multimodality of this experience and the
importance of instrumentality. The final Section V is a tentative conclu-
sion about how the twofold experience of musical performance may
contribute to the debate about the authenticity of musical performances.
2. Twofoldness and Pictures
Confusingly enough, the concept of twofoldness is used to elucidate
two very different aspects of our engagement with pictures. It is used both
as a necessary feature of ‘seeing-in’: our experience of seeing something
in a picture and as a necessary feature of our aesthetic appreciation of pic-
tures.As not all instances of seeing-in would count as aesthetic appreciation
(in fact, the vast majority of such instances wouldn’t), these two ques-
tions, and the corresponding two concepts of twofoldness need to be
clearly distinguished.
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The first question is this: what experience are we supposed to go
through when we see a picture of an object? What happens in our mind
when we see a depicted object in a picture? Ernst Gombrich claims that
what is constitutive of this experience is that our attention alternates
between the two dimensional surface and the three dimensional repre-
sented object (Gombrich 1960). Richard Wollheim, in contrast, argues
that the experience we are supposed to go through when seeing pictures is
a twofold one: we are simultaneously aware of the picture surface and the
represented object (Wollheim 1980, 1987, 1998; Nanay 2004, 2005, 2008,
2011; see also Lopes 1996, 2005). As Wollheim puts it, “The spectator is,
and remains, visually aware not only of what is represented but also of the
surface qualities of the representation” (Wollheim 1980, 214–15). This
feature of our experience of pictures is called ‘twofoldness’ and in some
form or other, many philosophical accounts of seeing-in endorsed it as a
necessary feature of our experience of pictures.2
The second, very different, question about our engagement with pic-
tures that invokes the concept of twofoldness is about the aesthetic
appreciation of pictures. As Wollheim says:
[I]n Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led to marvel endlessly at the way
in which line or brushstroke or expanse of colour is exploited to render
effects or establish analogies that can only be identified representationally.
(Wollheim 1980, 216)
This ‘marvelling endlessly’ at a Vermeer is, according to Wollheim, a
twofold experience: we are simultaneously attending to both the “line or
brushstroke or expanse of colour” and to the “analogies that can only be
identified representationally.” But this line of argument is supposed to
answer a very different question from the one about ‘seeing-in’. This
question is about the aesthetic appreciation of pictures and not about pic-
ture perception in general. Very few instances of picture perception count
as aesthetic appreciation—in the case of the vast majority of our encounter
with pictures, we do not appreciate them aesthetically.
Wollheim tries to answer both of these questions (the one about pic-
ture perception and the one about aesthetic appreciation) at the same time
and this led to a considerable amount of confusion. In fact, one of the
recurring criticisms of Wollheim’s account in general and his concept of
twofoldness in particular is that he wanted to posit twofoldness, some-
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thing that characterizes only our aesthetic appreciation of pictures, as a
necessary condition for picture perception in general (Levinson 1998, esp.
p. 229; Lopes 1996, esp. pp. 37–51; Lopes 2005, 28, 35). These criticisms
may have been uncharitable (Nanay 2005, 2010, 2011): a more charitable
interpretation would be that Wollheim held two different claims, one
about picture perception and one about the aesthetic appreciation of pic-
tures, and used two different concepts of twofoldness to characterize these
two different experiences.
Wollheim talks about simultaneous awareness of surface and scene,
not just in the definition quoted above but also in Wollheim (1998, 221)
and Wollheim (1987, 46). But the notion of awareness he uses is ambigu-
ous and as a result Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness itself is also
ambiguous. Here are two possible interpretations of twofoldness (both of
which we have good reasons to attribute to Wollheim):
(i) We consciously attend both to the depicted object and to some
properties of the surface.3
(ii) We represent both the depicted object and some of the properties
of the picture surface (while we may or may not attend to the sur-
face).
It has been argued that Wollheim took (ii) to be a necessary condition for
picture perception in general (Nanay 2005, 2010, 2011) and he took (i) to
be an important, maybe even necessary, feature of the aesthetic apprecia-
tion of pictures. I do not want to say more about (ii) and picture perception
as the notion of twofoldness I want to use in the context of our experience
of musical performances is (i). The important point is that twofoldness in
sense (i) is easy to confuse with twofoldness in sense (ii) and the question
about picture perception is also easy to confuse with the question about
aesthetic appreciation (and Wollheim didn’t do much to dispel these
potential confusions). I want to leave behind (ii) and the question of pic-
ture perception and focus on (i) and the aesthetic appreciation of pictures.
When Wollheim says that
in Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led to marvel endlessly at the way in
which line or brushstroke or expanse of colour is exploited to render effects
or establish analogies that can only be identified representationally
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he clearly talks about twofoldness in sense (i) as a crucial feature of the
aesthetic appreciation of these paintings. Thus, the concept of twofoldness
I will talk about in the rest of the paper is twofoldness in sense (i): con-
scious simultaneous attention both to the depicted object and to some
properties of the surface. And it is this concept of twofoldness that I take
Wollheim to hold to be a crucial aspect of our aesthetic appreciation of
pictures. The question is whether we can find a similar kind of twofold expe-
rience when it comes to the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances.
3. Twofoldness and Musical Performances
The claim I will defend here is that when we appreciate a musical
performance aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to both the features
of the performed musical work and the features of the token performance
we are listening to. First, some clarifications: what counts as the ‘musical
work’ here? And what counts as the ‘performance’? The short response is
that one can plug in any concept of ‘musical work’ in this account of the
aesthetic appreciation of musical performances—be it ‘action-types’,
‘eternal types’, ‘action tokens’, etc. (see Davies 2004; Dodd 2000, 2002,
2007; Currie 1989; Kivy 1983; Davies 2001; Levinson 1980; Rohrbaugh
2007; Howell 2002; Caplan-Matheson 2004, 2006). And we can also plug
in any concept of musical performance (Levinson 1990; Davies 2001,
151–97; Thom 1992; Godlovitch 1998; Benson 2003). The claim I am
making is about the experience of musical performances and not about
their ontology—it is consistent with any of the most widespread theories
of the ontology of music.
But some ontological frameworks are easier to use than others. For
the sake of simplicity, I will assume in the rest of the paper that musical
works are types. But with little modifications, the argument can be extended
to different ontological frameworks. Take nominalism, for example. Nel-
son Goodman famously argued that musical work is “the class of
performances compliant with a character” (Goodman 1968, 210). If one
accepts this nominalist ontological framework, then the main claim of the
paper can be rephrased in the following way: when we appreciate a musi-
cal performance aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to both the
features of the token performance we are listening to and to the features
of “the class of performances compliant with a character.” Similar con-
siderations apply in the case of other ontological frameworks.
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Second, it is important to emphasize that the simultaneous attention
to the features of the musical performance and to the musical work do not
need to be taken to be perceptual attention. Our attention to the features
of the token performance is likely to be perceptual (and I will say more
about the nature of this attention in Section IV below). But our attention
to the features of the musical work does not need to be, and in some onto-
logical frameworks cannot be, perceptual attention. Note that this
difference between the nature of attention in the two ‘folds’ is also present
in many accounts of pictorial twofoldness. Kendall Walton, for example,
explicitly takes our attention to the depicted object to be nonperceptual
(Walton 1998; see also Nanay 2004 on his concept of twofoldness).
Third, my claim is about the aesthetic appreciation of the perfor-
mance of a musical work, not about the aesthetic appreciation of the
musical work itself. The musical work can, in principle, be appreciated
aesthetically without listening to any of its performances. For example,
some people can sight-read scores and have real-time auditory experi-
ences of the musical work. As this is not an instance of appreciating the
performance of a musical work, I leave these cases aside. (Some might
argue that these people do in fact imagine performances of the musical
works and they appreciate these imagined performances. If this is so, then
the argument I will present below applies to the appreciation of these
imagined performances.) I will focus on the aesthetic appreciation of the
performance of musical works, but return to the question of the aesthetic
appreciation of musical works themselves as well as the connection
between these two kinds of aesthetic appreciations in the next section.
Third, what does it mean to attend to the features of the musical
work? The musical work, according to most accounts, is a type. But how
can we attend to the features of a type (as opposed to one of the tokens of
this type)? Note that this is a potential problem only if attention is inter-
preted as perceptual attention and, as we have seen above, I do not take
our attention to the features of the musical work to be perceptual.
Further, can we attend to the features of the musical work that we
hear for the first time? In this case, after all, we encounter the musical work
itself and the performance of this musical work at the same time. How can we
be in the position to attend to the features of both of these simultaneously?
We can indeed appreciate the performance of a musical work aes-
thetically even if we hear this musical work for the first time.When listening
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to the performance of a newly rediscovered Vivaldi opera (say, of
Motezuma, which was considered lost until 2002 and first performed in
modern times in 2005), I can attend to the features of this musical work—
features I attribute to Vivaldi’s works in general, features I attribute to
Vivaldi’s operas, to early eighteenth Century Italian operas in general, etc.
These are all features one can and does attribute to the musical work itself
and not the performance thereof. Hence, having listened to different per-
formances of a musical work previously is not necessary for the aesthetic
appreciation of the musical performance of this piece, but such previous
exposure is likely to enhance our ability to appreciate the performance of
this musical work aesthetically.
The substantial part of my main claim is about the simultaneous
nature of our attention: when we appreciate the performance of a musical
work aesthetically, we attend to both the features of the musical work and
those of the performance and we do so simultaneously. But what other
options are there? It seems that there are four possible options:
(i) We attend to the musical work only and not to the performance.
(ii) We attend to the performance only and not to the musical work.
(iii) We attend to both the performance and the musical work, but not
simultaneously.
(iv) We attend to both the performance and the musical work simul-
taneously.
I argue that (i), (ii) and (iii) are implausible.
Take (i) first. The suggestion is an odd one: that we would appreci-
ate the performance of a musical work by ignoring this performance. This
is, no doubt, the way at least some people listen to at least some musical
performances (really bad ones, for example), but it would be a mistake to
characterize the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances accord-
ingly. Even more importantly, in order to attend to the features of the
musical work while listening to a performance of this musical work pre-
supposes that one actively ignores the features of the performance
itself—if the performer hits the wrong key, we actively disregard it in
favour of the correct key in the musical work itself. But this way of
actively ignoring the performance we are listening to presupposes that we
attend to the performance itself—otherwise we could not disregard its
objectionable features.
According to (ii), when we appreciate the performance of the musi-
cal work, we attend to the performance only and not to the musical work
itself. But this also sounds odd: it would imply ignoring the musical work
the performance of which we are supposed to be appreciating aestheti-
cally. But then this would not constitute aesthetic appreciation of this
musical work. One can, of course, appreciate some aspects of the perfor-
mance while ignoring what musical work is being performed: one
potential example is the aesthetic appreciation of the performer’s techni-
cal skills. But one cannot appreciate the performance of a given musical
work while ignoring this musical work. The features of a performance that
are desirable in performing a Bruckner symphony may not be so desirable
when it comes to the performance of a Haydn string quartet.
Proposal (iii) is a bit more complicated. The suggestion is that our
attention, when aesthetically appreciating the performance of a musical
work, is alternating between features of the performance and features of
the musical work itself. But we do not attend to them simultaneously. One
way of thinking about this alternating attention is to think of it on the anal-
ogy of our alternating attention to the duck and the rabbit in the
duck/rabbit illusion. One can attend to one, but then one cannot attend to
the other and vice versa. Although we can attend to both aspects in turn,
we cannot attend to them at the same time.
A useful way of keeping (iii) and (iv) apart is to ask whether our aes-
thetic appreciation of musical performances is one single experience with
two aspects (one representing the features of the performance, the other
representing the features of the musical work), or it is the alternation of
two different experiences (one representing the features of the perfor-
mance, the other representing the features of the musical work). The
problem with this latter proposal, that is, proposal (iii), is that if our atten-
tion alternates between the features of the performance and the features of
the musical work, then it is not possible to attend to the relation between
the features of the performance and the features of the musical work. By
supposition, (iii) entails that one can attend to either the features of the
performance or the features of the musical work at any one time—it is not
possible to attend to both, hence, it is not possible to attend to the relation
between the two. But then it is not possible to attend to how any given ele-
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ment of the musical work is being performed because attending to this
would entail attending to the relation between the features of the perfor-
mance and those of the musical work.
One may have the following worry about this argument.4 It is possi-
ble to attend to the relation of two things while alternating our attention
between the two. I can alternate my attention between a red patch and an
orange patch that are a meter apart and nonetheless attend to the relation
between them: to the similarities and differences between them: that the
orange one is like the red but mixed with yellow. It is true that we can
attend to the similarities and differences between the colour of the two
patches while alternating our attention between the patches themselves,
but note that this case is very different from (iii) above. In (iii), the claim
is that our attention alternates between the features of the musical perfor-
mance and the features of the musical work. And the equivalent of this
claim would be to say that we can attend to the relation between the colour
of the two patches while alternating our attention between the colour of
the first patch (red) and the colour of the second patch (orange). This, in
turn, would imply that our attention alternates between a fully red colour
experience that does not in any way involve the colour orange and a fully
orange colour experience that does not in any way involve the colour red.
But if this were the case, then we could not attend to the relation between
the two colours: we could not attend to how the second colour is like the
first but with more yellow. While it may be possible to alternate our atten-
tion between two entities and also attend to the relation between their
properties, it is not possible to alternate our attention between two prop-
erties and also attend to the relation between these two properties.
Thus, the only remaining option is (iv): when we appreciate the per-
formance of a musical work aesthetically, we simultaneously attend to the
features of both the musical work itself and its performance. I argue in the
next section that this twofold experience helps us to understand a number
of important and salient features of our experience of musical performances.5
A final objection: it has been argued that our aesthetic appreciation
of pictures is a heterogeneous process. Sometimes it does involve simul-
taneous attention to the surface and the depicted scene, but some other
times it involves alternating attention or even ‘seeing through’ the canvas
(see Lopes 2005, Chapter 1; Nanay 2012). How can then we maintain
musical twofoldness as a fully general feature of the appreciation of musi-
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cal performances? Shouldn’t we expect as much variation in the musical
case as there seems to be in the pictorial case? The short answer is that the
claim I have been arguing for is about the aesthetic appreciation of musi-
cal performances—not of music in general (but see Section IV below).
The equivalent of this claim in the pictorial case would be about the aes-
thetic appreciation of the picture surface. But note that the disagreements
about the generality of twofoldness in the pictorial case is about the aes-
thetic appreciation of pictures per se (and not of the picture surface). And,
as I said at the very beginning, the twofoldness claim I am defending here
is not about the aesthetic appreciation of music in general, but about the
aesthetic appreciation of musical performances.
4. Aesthetic Appreciation of Musical Performances
Versus Aesthetic Appreciation of Music
In this section, I examine some important consequences of the claim
I argued for in the previous section and point out that my account can elu-
cidate some salient aspects of our experience of musical performances. I
will mention two such aspects: instrumentality and multimodality. These
two aspects of our experience of musical performances can help us to fill
in the details of what ‘attention to the features of the musical perfor-
mance’ is supposed to mean. Further, my account of the aesthetic
appreciation of musical performances has implications for our aesthetic
appreciation of the musical work itself, as well as the complex connection
between the two.
4. a. Instrumentality
Philip Alperson pointed out the importance of attention to features of
the musical instruments in the aesthetic appreciation of musical perfor-
mances (see esp. Alperson 2008, 47–48).6 He writes:
French horn players are in a better position to understand the level of
achievement of French horn playing than nonmusicians or even than musi-
cians who do not play the French horn. Indeed, very good French horn
players are likely to be in a better position to understand the level of achieve-
ment of very good French horn players than mediocre French horn players.
(Alperson 2008, 48.)
It is part of our aesthetic appreciation of the performance of a musical
work to appreciate the musicians’ use of their instruments. And those who
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are familiar with these instruments will be in a better position to appreci-
ate this performance aesthetically. This is not to say that we can only
appreciate the musical performance of a symphony if we can play on all
the instruments involved. But familiarity with the musical instruments
enhances our aesthetic appreciation.
This is especially relevant in the cases of musical works the perfor-
mance of which involve sophisticated technical skills, such as Paganini’s
24 Caprices. But, as Alperson points out, it is also true of works that do
not involve any technical skills: Alfred Brendel’s performance of
Mozart’s Sonata in F major (K. 222-494) “conveys a shimmering, grace-
ful, singing quality in the Andante movement of the work [and] produces
fluid, melodic, voicelike music from what is, after all, a percussion instru-
ment” (Alperson 2008, 47). The aesthetic appreciation of Brendel’s
performance involves some kind of awareness of this apparent conflict
between the ‘fluid, melodic, voicelike’ nature of the performed music and
the general features of the instrument.
The instrumentality of musical performances is important in its own
right and it helps us to fill in the details of my general account of the aes-
thetic appreciation of musical performances: one important feature of the
performance that we attend to when appreciating musical performances is
the instrumentality of this performance. But there is another reason why
we should take the instrumentality of musical performances seriously:
attending to the instrumentality of musical performances while appreciat-
ing musical performances can influence our aesthetic appreciation of the
musical work itself.
Remember: the main claim of this paper is about the aesthetic appre-
ciation of musical performances. But there is an intricate relation between
the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances and of the musical
works themselves. Importantly, the aesthetic appreciation of musical per-
formances can influence the aesthetic appreciation of the musical works.
And the hope is that if we think of the aesthetic appreciation of musical
performances as a twofold experience, then we can understand how the
aesthetic appreciation of musical performances can influence the aesthetic
appreciation of the musical works.
Take instrumentality again. If we listen to a performance of a musi-
cal work and attend simultaneously to both the features of the musical
work and the features of the performance, say, the use of the instruments,
then this experience can influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musi-
cal work itself—for example, it can make us appreciate the composer’s
orchestration better. But this influence can only be explained if the expe-
rience of listening to the performance of this work is a twofold
experience—otherwise it is difficult to see how our attention to the instru-
mentality of the performance (or to any other features of the performance)
could influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself.
4. b. Multimodality
The second important aspect of our aesthetic appreciation of musical
performances is multimodality. There is a lot of recent empirical evidence
that multimodal perception is the norm and not the exception—our sense
modalities interact in a variety of ways (see Spence-Driver 2004; Bertel-
son-Gelder 2004 for summaries; and O’Callaghan 2008, forthcoming for
philosophical overviews). Information in one sense modality can influence
the information processing in another sense modality at a very early stage
of perceptual processing (often in the primary visual cortex in the case of
vision, for example, [Watkins et al. 2006]). A simple example for this is
ventriloquism, where vision influences our audition: we experience the
voices as coming from the dummy and not from the ventriloquist (see
Bertelson 1999). But there are more surprising examples: if there is a flash
in your visual scene and you hear two beeps while the flash lasts, you
experience it as two flashes (Shams et al. 2000).
The experience of musical performances is also known to be multi-
modal: more specifically, visual stimuli play an important role in our
aesthetic appreciation of the expressiveness of musical performances
(Bergeron-Lopes 2009; Davidson 1993; Vines 2005, 2006). One impor-
tant consequence of these findings is that what I described above as
‘attention to the features of the musical performance’, that is, one fold of
the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation of musical perfor-
mances, is not a merely auditory affair—the attention to the features of the
musical performance is not necessarily and not exclusively auditory atten-
tion: it can and often does involve visual attention.
Take the famous performance of Rameau’s Les Indes Galantes by
Les Arts Florissants, conducted by William Christie and choreographed
by Blanca Li and Andrei Serban (2004, Opera National de Paris). The
choreography of the duet ‘Forêts plaisibles’ in the last act between Zima
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and Adario involves very pointed visual gestures against the beat, which
makes our multimodal experience of this performance of the duet shift
time signature. We hear it as having the time signature of 4/4 instead of
the original alla breve time signature (2/2) as prescribed in Rameau’s score.
An important consequence of this is that it is very difficult to listen
to any other performance of the same opera without hearing this duet in
4/4. Again, this is an important instance of how the twofold experience of
a musical performance can influence our aesthetic appreciation of the
musical work itself. Again, this influence can only be explained if the
experience of listening to the performance of this work is a twofold expe-
rience—otherwise it is difficult to see how our visual attention to the
choreography of the performance could influence our aesthetic apprecia-
tion of the musical work itself.
5. Conclusion: Framing the Authenticity Debate
An important debate in contemporary philosophy of music is about
the authenticity of musical performances: about how musical works
should be performed (Kivy 1995; Levinson 1990, 313–408; Davies 2001;
Young 1988; Dodd 2007, 201–39). Do we have to perform the musical
work as it was intended to be performed by the composer? Do we have to
perform it in such a way that the experience of the performance is com-
parable with the experience of the original performance?
This debate is especially heated when it comes to contemporary per-
formances of early music. Do we have to perform early music with original
instruments? Can we use piano instead of harpsichord? Can we use an early
eighteenth-century violin from Cremona when performing the Brandenburg
Concertos (which were originally performed far away from Cremona,
and, presumably, on violins very different from the ones made in Cremona)?
I argued in the last section that our twofold experience of the aes-
thetic appreciation of musical performances can and does influence our
aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself. But if this is true then
this puts the authenticity debate in new light. If our experience of musical
performances influences our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work
itself, then we can make an interesting connection between one’s position
in the authenticity debate and one’s general attitude towards the respective
importance of the two folds of the twofold experience of the aesthetic
appreciation of musical performances.
According to a conservative view, only authentic performances are
acceptable and a musical performance is authentic if it entails as exact a
replication of the original performance as possible. Those who hold such
a conservative view will consider the ‘performance’ fold of this twofold
experience to be inferior to the ‘musical work’ fold. The general idea is
that the performance can help us appreciate the musical work, but its fea-
tures should be dictated by the features of the musical work. In this case,
the twofold musical experience is an experience of how and whether the
features of the musical performance are appropriate to the features of the
musical work. When listening to most performances of a musical work,
one needs to actively ignore the features of the musical performance—this
act of ignoring the features of the musical performances, as we have seen,
is itself only possible if one has a twofold experience.
Those, however, who hold a less conservative position, according to
which even the experience of a nonauthentic musical performance can add
to our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself, are likely to
attribute different importance to the two ‘folds’. The ‘performance’ fold is
at least as important as the ‘musical-work’ fold as it can and often does
influence our aesthetic appreciation of the musical work itself. The fea-
tures of the performance can elucidate features of the musical work itself
—so much so that we may never be able to listen to future performances
of the same musical work in the same way again. In this case, the twofold
musical experience is an experience of how and whether features of the
musical performance differ from, and, if we are lucky, surpass, the features
we attribute to the musical work on the basis of previous performances.
To use the Rameau example from the last section, those who are on
the more conservative side in the authenticity debate will try to filter out
the visual and auditory stimuli that get us to experience the duet in 4/4—
as the authentic performance can only be in the time signature that appears
in Rameau’s original score. They may even fail to show up to this perfor-
mance (although Les Arts Florissants is one of the most influential early
music group that self-identifies as ‘authentic’). Those, on the other hand,
who are on the less conservative side in the authenticity debate will be
likely to let the experience of the duet in 4/4 when listening to this per-
formance influence their aesthetic appreciation of the musical work
itself—it may enrich their appreciation of the piece as more dynamic and
energetic than they previously supposed.
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In short, depending on how conservative a position one holds in the
authenticity debate, the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation
of musical performances will seem very different. By understanding these
different versions of the twofold experience of the aesthetic appreciation
of musical performances, we may be able to understand some of the
underlying motivations behind the authenticity debate.7
Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp and Cambridge University
NOTES
1. I am not committed to the claim that the player piano playing Nancarrow’s Studies
for Player Piano does not count as a genuine performance—if it does, then my account
applies to the aesthetic appreciation of these performances as well.
2. Walton (1990, 300–301; 2002, 33; 1991, 423). See Nanay (2004) on the differences
between Walton’s and Wollheim’s concept of twofoldness and also Hopkins (1998, esp.
pp. 15–17), Maynard (1994, esp. pp. 158–59). See also Lopes (2005, chapter 1) and Kul-
vicki (2006, 172–73) for moderately critical overviews. Gombrich’s account of our
experience of pictures is inconsistent with the idea of twofoldness. As he said: “is it pos-
sible to ‘see’ both the plane surface and the battle horse at the same time? If we have been
right so far, the demand is for the impossible. To understand the battle horse is for a
moment to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both ways . . .” (Gombrich 1961,
279).
3. One important consideration in favour of (i) is the following quote: “The seeing
appropriate to representations permits simultaneous attention to what is represented and to
the representation” (Wollheim 1980, 213). But it is not clear whether seeing-in only needs
to “permit” simultaneous attention or it is constituted by it.
4. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this objection.
5. The analogy from pictorial twofoldness may again be helpful here to elucidate the
importance of (iv). It has been suggested recently that sometimes, but not always, our
experience of pictures is inflected (Lopes 2005, 123–124; Hopkins 2010; Nanay 2010;
Podro 1991, 1998). As Hopkins says: “inflection [. . .] offers us the opportunity better to
appreciate how the [depicted scene] emerges from the [picture’s design]” (Hopkins 2010,
165). In other words, when we have inflected pictorial experiences, we are aware of a rela-
tional property (labelled as a ‘design-scene property’ by Nanay [2010]). And in the case of
the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances, we get something structurally similar
to inflection. When we have an inflected pictorial experience we are attending to the rela-
tion between the depicted scene and the way it is depicted. And when we appreciate
musical performances aesthetically, we are also attending to a relation: the relation
between features of the musical performance and those of the musical work. We can
import the metaphors that are used to described inflection to the musical case: we appre-
BENCE NANAY620
MUSICAL TWOFOLDNESS 621
ciate how the features of the musical work ‘emerge from’ the features of the performance,
etc. As inflection involves the twofold experience of the depicted scene and the way it is
depicted, the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances involves the twofold experi-
ence of the features of the performance and the features of the musical work.
6. Note that Alperson comes close to endorsing a claim that could be considered to be
a special case of the main claim defended in this paper. He argues that when we appreci-
ate a musical performance, we have a ‘double consciousness’ (Alperson 2008, 47) of the
instrumentality of music and the performed musical work itself. He even uses the term
‘twofoldness’ to characterize this ‘double consciousness’ (ibid).
7. This work was supported by the EU FP7 CIG grant PCIG09-GA-2011-293818 and
the FWOOdysseus grant G.0020.12N. I am grateful for an anonymous referee’s comments.
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